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As corporations consider approaches for doing business in or near
unstable parts of the world, some will face increased concerns for whether
they are taking appropriate steps to ensure employee safety. Corporations
lacking the internal resources to establish security protocols for higher-risk
locales may choose to outsource that function to private security
contractors. Viewpoints on doing so can differ.
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Critics note that private security companies have, at times, generated
controversy and attracted negative publicity.1 On the other hand, a multinational corporation’s sending its employees into potentially hazardous
regions of the world - without adequately providing for employee or
facility safety - poses its own of set of reputational and legal risks.2
Responsible private security companies can help some companies
responsibly manage those risks.3
Incidents involving a private security company’s use of force in
response to real or perceived threats can and do occur, however. Those
affected by these incidents sometimes elect to pursue legal action in the
United States - perhaps with the perception that the U.S. legal system may
be more transparent and efficient than that in their home country.4
Claimants may also view the U.S. court system as more able to provide a
more just (or financially appropriate) remedy.5
This article provides some background on the private security industry
and how it has evolved principally from serving sovereigns or governments
to also serving the private sector. This article also discusses the types of
legal action that corporations may face if they retain private security
companies to provide for employee or facility security outside the United
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1. See, e.g., Audrey Gillan, Blackwater: Private U.S. Security Firm Mired in Iraq
Controversy, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2009, 11:46 PM), https://www.the guardian.com
/world/2009/jan/29/blackwater-iraq-security-contractor
[https://perma.cc/4NKJ-HG7U]
(describing controversies involving the private security contractor Blackwater).
2. See, e.g., Patrick Sullivan, Family of Man Killed in Iraq Sues Contractor, RECORDEAGLE
(June
5,
2009),
http://static.record-eagle.com/2005/jun/05hulett.htm
[https://perma.cc/WLD9-SFYD] (detailing the story of an employee killed while working
for the corporation Halliburton in Iraq); Grieving Daughter Sues Halliburton, CNN MONEY,
(Mar. 31, 2005, 10:46 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2005/03/31/news/international/
iraq_halliburton/ [https://perma.cc/XAD7-AZHC] (describing a lawsuit against Halliburton
alleging the company did not properly protect one of its employees who was killed in Iraq).
3. See Kevin Strom et al., The Private Security Industry: A Review of the Definitions,
Available Data Sources, and Paths Moving Forward § 2.1 (unpublished report, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, on file with National Criminal Justice Reference Service, Dec. 2010),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/232781.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZHA8-UZ2T]
(noting experts attending American Society for Industrial Security International (ASIS)
symposium identified risk management as one of 18 core elements of private security field).
4. See, e.g., Holding Private Security Contractors Accountable: The Case Against
Blackwater, CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RTS. NEWSLETTER (Ctr. for Constitutional Rts.
Justice, New York, N.Y.), Winter 2007 1-2, http://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/assets/
files/newsletters/CCR_Newsletter_winter07.pdf [https://perma.cc/8J3K-47PQ] (noting that
a suit brought on behalf of Iraqi citizens in U.S. alleged that a private military contractor
“fostered a culture of lawlessness . . . encouraging them to act in company’s financial
interests at the expense of human life”).
5. Id. (alleging further that the State Department’s “action demonstrates the
importance of civil damages cases . . . for seeking justice when the government is protecting
corporate interests at the expense of human life”) (emphasis added).
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States, if incidents occur, and if legal action is brought in the U.S. Finally,
this article reviews legal arguments which have been successful when
defending corporations in these actions. Certain of these arguments are
distinct to this area of litigation.
I.

INDUSTRY BACKGROUND

In today’s parlance, the term “private military company” (“PMC”)
usually connotes a firm providing surrogate military services to a
government or sovereign. PMCs are often associated with the furnishing of
military or military-support services which employer or host countries lack
the ability or inclination to provide for themselves, and outsource to a
private sector entity.6
The term “private security company” (“PSC”) can have different
connotations, indicating firms which are apt to be limited to providing
security services for corporate personnel or privately-owned installations,
and also for certain governmental personnel or dignitaries traveling outside
their home countries.7
In practice, the distinction between PMCs and PSCs can be blurry.
Certain firms offer both types of services.8 And within a single firm,
personnel and resources may migrate between providing military and
support services for governments and providing security for private
corporations - depending on demand, conditions to be addressed, etc. For
example, noted PMC/PSC Aegis Defense Services describes itself as “a
major security provider to the US government” but as also having “a
significant portfolio of [o]il and [g]as sector clients.”9

Reputable PMCs or PSCs typically originate in militarily-advanced
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6. James M. O’Brien, Private Military Companies: An Assessment 4 (Sept. 2008)
(unpublished thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California) (on file with author),
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/3961/08Sep_OBrien.pdf?sequen
[https://perma.cc/ULZ9-9HDA] (noting “proxy military companies fall under the larger
PMC definition”).
7. Id. (opining that “private security companies are a type of PMC, but with a
comparatively reduced mission set”).
8. Id. (commenting on a firm which acts as a “prototypical ‘all-purpose’ private
military company.”).
9. Security Companies, EMBASSY OF THE U.S. (last updated June 19, 2016),
http://iraq.usembassy.gov/consular/us/resources/security_companies.html
[https://perma.cc/8KCJ-VK4V].
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countries.10 Former officers of developed nations’ militaries tend to hold
leadership positions in more reputable firms.11 Military personnel’s
migrating into work with PMCs or PSCs has been attributed to several
causes including military downsizing, early retirement incentives, and the
financial benefits of PMC employment12 as compared to regular military
pay.13 While even elite soldiers’ salaries may be like those of mid-level
government employees, some - but by no means all - contract PMC
personnel can be compensated with per-day rates resembling those of
private-sector consultants.14
Of interest to both tax-payers and potential clients, a Congressional
Budget Office (“CBO”) report notes that the costs of certain private
security contractors are comparable to those of a U.S. military unit
performing similar functions, particularly when peacetime breaks are
considered.15 During peacetime, private contracts need not be renewed,

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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10. The Private Military Companies Perspective, in HOUSE OF COMMONS-SELECT
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Ch. 2.1 (Aug. 1, 2002),
http://www.publications.parliment.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/922/2061322.htm
[https://perma.cc/4XJ8-VYB7] (describing how PMCs and PSCs generally originate in
advanced, western countries).
11. PMCs operating in the so-called “lethal capability” market generally work with a
small number of permanent staff, but maintain contact with personnel who can be called
upon for different contracts. Id. at Ch. 2.2.4. Strategic Consulting International, for
example, reportedly has maintained a permanent staff of about twelve people, but has or had
contacts with another 150 or so who could be available for projects as needed. Id. at Ch.
2.2.3. Some claim that the PMC Executive Outcomes had a permanent staff of only about
thirty, but could raise a battalion of 650 men within 15 days. Id. Only paying for additional
personnel on an as-needed basis obviously economizes on overhead expenses.
12. To an extent, these trends may cannibalize the west’s militaries, particularly within
the officer echelons. See Rebecca Weiner, Private Military Contractors Come with Strings
Attached, HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL BELFER CTR. NEWSLETTER (Belford Ctr. for Science
and Int’l Affairs), Winter 2005-06, at 1, available at http://www.belfercenter.org/
publication/private-military-contractors-come-strings-attached
[https://perma.cc/WW43NJC4]. Lured by reports of cash-salary increases up to 400%, hundreds of soldiers have
decided not to re-enlist, and instead have entered the private sector. Id. Fortunately for the
U.S., government reports also indicate that the increased employment of private military
contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, did not appear to have increased attrition
of military personnel. Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq, CONGRESSIONAL
BUDGET OFFICE REP. 11 (Aug. 2008) (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNT. OFFICE REP. at 35
(2005)).
13. HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.2 (discussing the reasons for PMC
emergence).
14. Weiner, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing PMC employment payment).
15. For perspective, in 2007, private security guards working for companies like
Blackwater USA and DynCorp International were earning up to $1,222 per day, or about
$445,000 per year; in contrast, a U.S. Army sergeant earned $140 to $190 per day in pay
and benefits, or about $51,100 to $69,350 a year. U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
REP., supra note 12, at 8. The report explains that the “figure of $1,222 a day represents the
contractor’s billing rate, not the amount paid to the contractor’s employees. The billing rate
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while regular military units are typically maintained in full force
structure.16
B. Increased instability in regions with hard-power vacuums has
increased demand for PMCs and PSCs.
Certain factors likely contributed to PMCs and PSCs appearing on
governmental and corporate radars.17
One observer notes, “[N]ot
coincidentally, the rise of these companies . . . coincid[ed] with the
pullback of western nations18 and the United Nations from peace-keeping
and peace-enforcing.”19 Also, there appears to be little doubt that PMCs
populated by many recently-retired military personnel have emerged to fill
voids when conflicts have erupted after the Cold War.20 Military vacuums

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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is greater than an employee’s pay because it includes the contractor’s indirect costs,
overhead and profit.” Id. at 14.
16. Id.
17. See Strom et al., supra note 3, at § 4.4.5 (“Privatization of military functions has
also seen an upswing . . . [A]n estimated 20,000 individuals have been hired as contract
private military guards in Iraq. Private military guards may ‘provide logistical support to
armed forces and also perform protection, training, consulting, and planning services . . .
[and] some . . . actually engage in combat under contract.’”) (citations omitted).
18. Increased use of PSCs or PMCs is not confined to non-western governments. In
Iraq, the U.S. employed 155,000 contractors – or about the same as the number of U.S.
soldiers there – while toward the end of the Afghanistan campaign, 207,000 contractors
supported 175,000 soldiers. America’s Paid Boots on the Ground, THE WEEK (Nov. 8,
2014),
http://theweek.com/articles/442453/americas-paid-boots-ground
[https://perma.cc/8N6E-2DH7]. In 2006, there were an estimated 20,000 contractors
working for an estimated sixty PMCs in conflicts where western interests were implicated.
Rebecca Weiner, supra note 12. Increasingly, PMCs contract to handle core military
functions, such as combat training, interrogation, operational support and strategic planning.
Id. And, according to the report of a meeting of PMC industry experts conducted under
U.N. auspices, there are now a very large number of PMC contractors operating in what has
become a $100 billion industry. Lindsey Cameron, Private Military Companies: Their
Status Under International Humanitarian Law and its Impact on Their Regulation, 88 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 573, 575 (Sept. 2006) (citing Report of the Third Meeting of Experts on
traditional new forms of mercenary activity, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/23, ¶ 12). Toward the
end of 2014, there were some 1,600 military contractors still working for the U.S. in Iraq.
Id. The PMC industry now appears to be a significant part of the United States’ combat,
anti-terror and security landscape. Steven Schooner, a former White House military
procurement official who studied contractor policy at George Washington University,
asserts that Americans need to be aware that their “government has increasingly delegated
to the private sector the responsibility to stand in harm’s way and, if required, die for
America.” Id.
19. See, e.g., HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.2.3 (quoting Herbert Howe,
Global Order and Security Privatisation, INST. FOR NAT’L STRATEGIC STUDIES, No. 140
(May 1998)).
20. See David Isenberg, Private Military Contractors and the U.S. Grand Strategy,
INT’L PEACE RESEARCH INST. (“PRIO”), Jan. 2009, at 5 (describing how the military
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in areas of conflict have contributed to demand for PMCs on the part of
governments formerly supported by super-powers; these governments want
continued military assistance in the absence of superpower or U.N.
support.21
In addition, the elimination of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, efforts to
restrain or topple or undermine the Assad regime in Syria while
concurrently containing and defeating ISIS, and other disturbances to prior
governmental orders in the region, together with “hard-power” vacuums,
have caused long-suppressed ethnic, political, or religious rivalries in the
Middle East to resurface. These changes have led to a number of intrastate and cross-border conflicts between ethnic or religious groups increasing instability in certain countries and adding urgency to the need to
protect corporate employees or facilities which may be nearby.
Also, recent terror attacks in Europe and increased political instability
in areas of Africa, for example - all at a time when the West may be
reluctant to increase commitments of their own militaries or peace-keeping
personnel22 - have also likely fueled demand for private security
companies’ services.
C. The industry and observers have spoken to a number of concerns.
Concerns Encountered; Responsive Viewpoints
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continually turned more to private contractors as the Cold War concluded).
21. See HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.1 (explaining how losing
superpower’s support had led to the expanding role of PMCs in certain nations).
22. Id. (discussing the increase in PMC services).
23. Cameron, supra note 18.
24. See id. at 598 (citing, among others, Max Boot, Darfur Solution: Send in the
Mercenaries, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2006, at B13, and Kristen Fricchione, The Casualties in
Evolving Warfare: Impact of Private Military Firms’ Proliferation on the International
Community, 23 WISC. INT’L L.J. (Fall 2005)).
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Corporations considering engaging a PSC or PMC are likely to
encounter questions of whether these firms employ adequately trained and
disciplined individuals. These concerns can result, for example, from the
U.S. government’s use of the firms involved in misconduct or incidents like
the mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib23 or the shootings at Nisour
Square in Iraq.
Despite well-publicized negative incidents, others contend that PSCs
are the future of international corporate security. Some predict that PMCs
may also become the future of United Nations or other joint peace-keeping
efforts.24 Still others assert that PSCs perform necessary services that inhouse corporate security staff are incapable of performing, and that PMCs
provide military or support functions that the U.N., as well as foreign
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25. Isenberg, supra note 20.
26. CHRISTOPHER KINSEY, CORPORATE SOLDIERS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: THE
RISE OF PRIVATE SECURITY COMPANIES 10 (2006) (stating that “[e]ven though private
military and security companies are relatively new to international security, they are
increasingly being recognized by governments, civil societies and international
organizations as legitimate actors that can have a positive impact on international security”)
(emphasis added).
27. Simon Akam, The Vagabond King, NEW STATESMAN 4 (Feb. 2, 2012), available at
http://www.newstatesman.com/africa/2012/01/sierra-leone-strasser-war
[https://perma.cc/PU3G-FK6L].
28. Id. at 5.
29. HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 10, at Ch. 2.2.5.
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governments which aspire to become more democratic, are unable to
provide. In some cases, critics of U.N. peacekeeping forces have even
called for private security firms to take over command from those forces.25
The positive experiences of certain governments with well-trained
PMCs appear to have improved private-sector opportunities for PSCs.26
Even in contexts arguably resembling adventurism, PMCs have informed
advocates.
In 1995, for example, the political and investment climate in the westAfrican region near Sierra Leone was very unstable. In a closely-observed
move, that country’s government (with financing provided, in part, by the
International Monetary Fund) engaged a PMC to help force Liberianbacked rebel forces out of the country. Once Sierra Leone terminated this
engagement, the violence promptly returned.27 Observers state that only
after a British-led military intervention stiffened a floundering U.N.
peacekeeping mission28 did the country stabilize to the point that major
companies again considered investing in the affected region.
Dr. Christopher Spearin of the Canadian Forces College Department
of Defence Studies has noted that, in Sierra Leone, the host nation’s
military stated that PMCs “did a positive job . . . [W]e did not consider
them mercenaries but as people bringing in some sanity” to an otherwise
untenable and violent environment.29
Other advocates argue that PMCs can have more practical impact –
and can be more cost-efficient - than U.N.-sponsored security forces
assigned to unstable regions. One authority laments:
With a depressing dearth of nations volunteering to send more
competent troops, the U.N. is forced to rely on . . . inept
militaries to do their peace keeping and peace enforcement. . .
[A]s a result, the U.N. is often left with world’s least competent
soldiers to do the world’s most difficult peace missions, almost
ensuring failures and setbacks such as Angola . . . [,] Sierra
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Leone[, and other unstable areas.]30

House of Commons’ minutes observe that, as of August 2002, the
operations that the U.N. undertook in Sierra Leone after PMC engagements
were terminated cost over a half a billion dollars – and many would
question whether the results were worth a fraction of that amount.31
In contrasting these U.N. peacekeeping or policing efforts with PMC
engagements, Tim Spicer, a founder of Aegis Defence Services, noted that
“UN involvement in Angola cost $1 million a day – $365 million a year –
and achieved absolutely nothing,” while “Executive Outcomes charged the
Angola government $80 million for two years and got Unita to the
conference table, putting an end to the war in a couple of months.” 32
For these and other reasons, PMC engagements have increased
significantly since the late 1980’s.33 PMCs were employed in Desert Storm
in 1991, in the Balkans in the mid-1990s, and subsequently in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.34 PMCs have been engaged in approximately 80 conflicts in
the decade from 1990 to 2000 alone.35
D. As engaging PMCs becomes more acceptable for governments,
PSCs have become a more common option in the private sector.
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30. Id. at Ch. 2.4.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting LT. COL. C. SPICER OBE, AN UNORTHODOX SOLDIER (Mainstream
Publ’g 1999)).
33. Isenberg, supra note 20, at 12.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 13.
36. See
generally
Aegis
Defence
Services,
WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aegis_Defence_Services
[https://perma.cc/L4UA-QW4C]
(last modified Dec. 10, 2016, 10:49 PM) (describing the nature of Aegis Defence Services’
offerings).
37. Id.

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 49 Side B

In part because PMCs have achieved positive results for certain
governmental clients – while simultaneously avoiding too many
controversies – western governments have appeared more receptive to
engaging PMCs.
The U.S. Department of Defense, for example, contracted with Aegis
Defence Services to provide security support services to the Project and
Contracting Office, which was responsible for managing reconstruction
programs in Iraq and Afghanistan and also to provide security for the Oilfor-Food inquiry.36 Also, in May 2011, it was announced that the U.S.
military would pull out of Baghdad and be replaced by eight PMCs and
PSCs which would take over security operations.37 Aegis Defence Services
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also received a contract from the U.S. Department of State to provide
security at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan.38
A private corporation’s contracting with a PSC may draw less public
scrutiny than, for example, the U.S. Department of State’s or an African
host government’s employing a PMC. But it seems apparent that, as
contracting with PMCs has become more common among governments,
contracting with PSCs has similarly become more common for private
companies.
For example, some have publicly called for shipping companies to
engage PSCs to help protect crew members, vessels and cargoes in pirateplagued waters off the east coast of Somalia, as “everyone recognizes that
the regular naval ships are not going to stay there.”39 If ship-owners need
to increase security onboard their ships by arming someone, the argument
goes, it would be better to rely on trained professional contractors than to
simply give arms to inexperienced crew members.40
The situation has progressed to the point that the website for the U.S.
Embassy in Baghdad, Iraq (to give one example) provides a list of PSCs
available to companies or persons doing business in that country.41 The
website is careful to note the list does not constitute an endorsement by the
U.S. government.42 Nevertheless, the listing gives the impression that the
U.S. Embassy is aware that private corporations may need the services of a
PSC in the country, and that, depending on circumstances, engaging a PSC
is not frowned upon by the U.S. government.
II.

LEGAL ACTIONS

C M
Y K
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38. Id.
39. David Isenberg, Pirates, PSCs and Lawyers, THE HUFFINGTON POST (May 27,
2010, 12:37 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-isenberg/pirates-psc-and-lawyers_
b_592036.html [https://perma.cc/RRP4-4LU5].
40. Id.
41. See EMBASSY OF THE U.S., supra note 9 (listing available PSC companies).
42. See id. (stating that the “U.S. government assumes no responsibility for the
professional ability or integrity of the persons or firms whose names appear on the list”)
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Certain PSC employees working in unstable areas are often armed.
And the types of environments necessitating engagement of a PSC in the
first instance are often those where the potential for conflict exists. Given
the potential for conflict which causes PSCs to be hired in the first instance,
and given that types of protective services that PSCs are expected to
provide, clients should not be surprised if incidents involving the use of
force sometimes occur.
Rightly or wrongly, the United States are viewed as a litigious society.
When incidents involving PSCs occur, affected locals – whether genuinely
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wronged or merely opportunistic – may bring action in the U.S. with the
view that this country has an accessible, transparent and, at times, generous
legal system.
Generally speaking, legal actions implicating PSCs result from claims
brought under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) or claims under state tort
law. In addition, some plaintiffs raise claims under the Torture Victim
Protection Act (“TVPA”). The following discussion addresses some of the
principal issues PSC clients can encounter in addressing these claims.
A. Alien Tort Statute
The Alien Tort Statute is a federal statute, first enacted in 1789,
providing that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.”43 The ATS, however, “is a
jurisdictional statute” only, and creates “no new causes of action.”44 The
plain language of the ATS states it will not confer jurisdiction for claims
unless the plaintiff is “an alien . . . suing for a tort committed in violation of
international law.”45
ATS claims have three elements: (1) the plaintiff must be an alien, (2)
suing for a tort, (3) which has been committed in violation of international
law.46 Generally, the cases suggest that an “alien” within the meaning of
the ATS means a non-U.S. citizen.47
1. Jurisdictional Prerequisites

a U.S. Court might, as a matter of international comity, stay an Alien Tort suit
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43. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2015).
44. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
45. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 583 (11th Cir. 2015).
46. See, e.g., Balaco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir.
2011) (providing the basic elements of an ATS tort claim).
47. See, e.g., Sai v. Clinton, 778 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) (noting potential need
to “conclude that Plaintiff is an alien capable of bringing claims under the Alien Tort Statute
rather than a U.S. citizen”), aff’d, No. 11-5142, 2011 WL 4917030 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2011);
Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 39 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that an ATS claim failed
as a result of the putative plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship).
48. Generally, courts hold that the ATS imposes no requirement that a plaintiff first
exhaust his or her remedies in the foreign jurisdiction where the alleged wrong occurred.
See, e.g., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d in part, dism’d
in part, 402 F. App’x 834 (4th Cir. 2010), and cases cited therein. Courts, however, have
recognized that, while the ATS contains no rigid exhaustion requirement,
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Before reaching the merits of an alien’s international law tort claim,
courts must be satisfied that the jurisdictional prerequisites are satisfied. 48
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Decisions addressing these jurisdictional requisites constitute much of ATS
case law.
The cases indicate that courts must assure themselves that: (1) the
complaint pleads a violation of the law of nations, (2) the presumption
against extraterritorial application of the ATS, announced by the Supreme
Court in Kiobel II,49 does not bar the claim, (3) customary international
law, or the body of law recognized as the “law of nations,” recognizes the
asserted liability of the defendant, and (4) the theory of liability alleged by
plaintiffs, for example, aiding and abetting or conspiracy, is also
recognized by customary international law.50 Defects in any of these
jurisdictional requirements will be fatal to the plaintiff’s claims, but courts
have discretion as to the order and manner of considering jurisdictional
prerequisites.51
Also, depending on the circuit, the ATS may not confer jurisdiction
where the defendant is a corporation.52
a. A Hurdle: Pleading a Violation of the Law of Nations - the
Alleged Misconduct Must be Severe

that had been filed in the U.S. Court, in order to give the courts of the nation in
which the violation had occurred a chance to remedy it, provided that the nation
seemed willing and able to do that.
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Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011).
49. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (Kiobel II), 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
50. Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2015).
51. Id.
52. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010), aff’d on
other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668-69 (U.S. 2013).
53. See KRISTINE A. HUSKEY, THE AMERICAN WAY: PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
& U.S. LAW AFTER 9/11, AN UPDATE – 2010 34 (Priv-War Report Nat’l Report Series 3/10,
Oct. 1, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2184090 [https://perma.cc/E35CPEMS].
54. 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004).
55. Id. at 728 (citation omitted).
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In the typical case involving a corporation’s engaging a PSC or PMC,
the non-U.S. citizen will bring action under the ATS against both the PSC
and its corporate client seeking compensation for torts based on a violation
of “international law” or the law of nations.53
Though the ATS was part of the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Supreme
Court did not directly address the statute until a 2004 decision, Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain.54 Noting reasons for “great caution in adapting the law
of nations to private rights,”55 the Court observed that the Act contemplates
that “district courts would recognize private causes of action for certain
torts in violation of the law of nations” based on “‘specific, universal, and
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56. Id. at 725, 732.
57. Id. at 732 (citation omitted).
58. Id. (citation omitted).
59. Id. at 727.
60. Id. at 736, 738.
61. Id. at 738.
62. Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003).
63. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that
“torture [is] . . . prohibited by law of nations.”). Cf. Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208
(2d Cir. 2008) (holding that “detention without being informed of the availability of
consular notification and access” is not a “tort in violation of customary international law
cognizable under the ATS”); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem.
Co., 517 F.3d 104, 117-23 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting a “lack of consensus in international
community on whether proscription on poison” would apply to use of herbicide that harmed
people when “[p]laintiffs nowhere allege that the government intended to harm human
beings through its use of Agent Orange”); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 293 F.3d 440, 448 (2d
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obligatory’” international law norms.56
Sosa is interpreted to mean that, to be actionable under the ATS, the
alleged misconduct supporting jurisdiction must be severe. An appropriate
ATS defendant is “an enemy of all mankind” (and consequently, an enemy
of most sovereigns) who has engaged in one of the “handful of heinous
actions. . . which violate definable, universal and obligatory norms.”57 For
example, appropriate ATS defendants include, “‘the torturer . . . the pirate
and slave trader.’”58
Consistent with this “high bar,”59 the Court found that a short-term,
allegedly “arbitrary” detention was not a violation of a “norm of customary
international law so well defined as to support” an ATS claim.60
Specifically, “a single illegal detention of [a Mexican national] of less than
a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities and a
prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so
well defined as to support [a] federal remedy.”61
More severe misconduct also may not suffice. For example, murder
of one private party by another, universally proscribed by the domestic law
of all countries (subject to varying definitions), is not actionable under the
ATS as a violation of customary international law because the “nations of
the world” have not demonstrated that this wrong is “of mutual, and not
merely several, concern.”62
Lower federal courts continue to parse through the misconduct rising
to the level of violating “specific, universal and obligatory” norms.
Generally speaking, to be actionable under the ATS, the misconduct must
be extreme, for example, torture or something equivalently reprehensible,
as opposed to arbitrary detentions without cause, racial or religious
discrimination by private parties or entities, exposure of individuals to
chemical hazards, etc.63
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Practitioners should be aware that courts (and litigants) still wrestle
with a precise definition of misconduct violating international law, given
that law’s “soft, indeterminate character.”64
b. The presumption against extra-territorial application bars
many claims.
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Cir. 2000) (stating when committed by private actor, “neither racial nor religious
discrimination” is a violation of the law of nations; but “war crimes and genocide are
actionable under the Alien Tort Claims Act” when committed by private actor).
64. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted); see id. at 1016 (“[S]ome of the most widely accepted international
norms are vague, such as ‘genocide’ and ‘torture.’”).
65. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (U.S. 2013).
66. Id. at 1662-63.
67. Id. at 1677-78 (Breyer, J. concurring).
68. Id. at 1669.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 585 (11th Cir. 2015).
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A significant jurisdictional hurdle for ATS claims is also found in the
presumption against extra-territorial application.
In Kiobel II, the Supreme Court addressed whether an ATS “claim
may reach conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign.”65 In
Kiobel II, Nigerian petitioners who became U.S. residents filed claims
under the ATS against Dutch, British and Nigerian corporations based on
events that occurred in Nigeria.66 These corporations had only attenuated
contacts with United States – for example, their shares traded on the New
York Stock Exchange and an affiliated investor-relations office existed in
New York City.67 The Supreme Court determined the ATS claims were
barred, holding that “the presumption against extra-territoriality applies to
claims under the ATS, and nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.”68
The Supreme Court noted alongside its holding that “all the relevant
conduct took place outside the United States.”69 Though the Court did not
hold that plaintiffs may never bring ATS claims based upon extra-territorial
conduct, it made clear that, to be viable, such claims must “touch and
concern the territory of the United States” and “must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extra territorial application.”70
Because Kiobel II was a so-called “‘foreign-cubed’ case”– a foreign
plaintiff suing a foreign defendant where the relevant conduct occurred on
foreign soil – the events therein neither touched nor concerned U.S.
territory with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application.71
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The court in Kiobel II did not fully explain its “touch and concern”
language, nor did it precisely define “sufficient force” or “relevant
conduct.”72 The Court also did not address what constitutes more than a
“mere corporate presence” in the U.S. sufficing to permit jurisdiction.73
Courts continue to work through these issues.
i.

Second Circuit – Two Prongs

C M
Y K
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72. See Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669 (holding that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to ATS claims).
73. Id.
74. Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 182 (2d Cir. 2014).
75. Id. at 182-83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
76. Id. at 183.
77. Id. (citing 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
78. 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010).
79. Id. at 266-67.
80. Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185 (emphasis added).
81. Id. at 185, 195.

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 52 Side B

The Second Circuit in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp. determined that
“domestic contacts” are at the heart of Kiobel’s touch-and-concern inquiry,
observing that “evaluation of the presumption’s application to a particular
case is essentially an inquiry into whether the domestic contacts are
sufficient to avoid triggering the presumption at all.”74 Examining the
complaint, the Mastafa court found allegations only of “some ‘contact’
between the injuries alleged [which occurred extraterritorially] and the
territory of the United States.”75
Thus, the presumption against
extraterritoriality was triggered, but not “self-evidently dispositive”; further
jurisdictional inquiry was needed.76
The Second Circuit then relied on Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd.,77
an earlier Supreme Court case applying the presumption against
extraterritoriality to cases arising under the Securities Exchange Act.78 In
Morrison, the Court set forth the “focus” test, which requires courts to
determine whether “the ‘focus’ of congressional concern,” or the conduct
“that the statute seeks to ‘regulate,’” occurred in the territory of the United
States.79
Applying this focus test, the Second Circuit found that the focus of
jurisdictional inquiries under the ATS should be on “the conduct alleged to
violate the law of nations, and the location of that conduct.”80 In Mastafa,
this was conduct “alleged to aid and abet the violation.”81 The court in
Mastafa determined that to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the complaint must plead two prongs:
(1) conduct of the defendant that “touch[es] and concern[s]” the
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United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption
against extraterritoriality, and (2) that the same conduct, upon
preliminary examination, states a claim for a violation of the law
of nations or aiding and abetting another’s violation of the law of
nations.82

ii.

Fourth Circuit – Weight of U.S.-Related Facts Giving
Rise to the Claim

In Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech, Inc., an action against a military
contractor, the Fourth Circuit noted that Kiobel II “broadly stated that the

C M
Y K
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82. Id. at 187.
83. Id. at 189.
84. Id. at 195.
85. Id.
86. See id. at 193-96 (stating that allegations of the requisite mens rea standard were
made only in “conclusory terms”).
87. Id. at 193.
88. Id. at 194.
89. Id. at 195-96.

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 53 Side A

Thus, the inquiry depended on “alleged conduct by anyone — U.S.
citizen or not — that took place in the United States and aided and abetted
a violation of the law of nations.”83
The Second Circuit noted that the plaintiffs had “alleged specific,
domestic conduct,” including the defendants’ oil-purchase transactions and
financing oil transactions, from within the United States and the facilitation
of illicit payments and financing arrangements through a U.S.-based bank
account.84 Given these specific and non-conclusory allegations of domestic
conduct, the Mastafa court found that the plaintiffs’ claims appeared to
touch and concern the United States with sufficient force to displace the
presumption and satisfy the “first prong” of the court’s jurisdictional
analysis.85
Though domestic conduct displaced the presumption against
extraterritoriality, the plaintiffs’ claims nonetheless failed the second prong
of the court’s jurisdictional inquiry. Specifically, plaintiffs failed to
plausibly plead that the defendants’ aiding and abetting of the international
law violations met the mens rea standard of the Second Circuit.86
Sufficient pleading would require a plaintiff to plausibly allege that
defendants acted with the purpose or intent “to aid and abet violations of
customary international law.”87 While the plaintiffs’ complaint appeared to
allege something akin to purpose, it did so only in conclusory terms.88
Consequently, the Mastafa court concluded it could not exercise
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ claims.89
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‘claims,’ rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must touch and concern
United States territory with sufficient force.”90 The Fourth Circuit reasoned
that the Supreme Court’s language instructs lower courts to “apply a factbased analysis” and that “courts should not assume that the presumption
categorically bars cases that manifest a close connection to United States
territory.”91 Rather, courts should “consider all the facts that give rise to
ATS claims, including the parties’ identities and their relationship to the
causes of action.”92
Applying this fact-based analysis, the Fourth Circuit found several
factors relevant (and, together, dispositive) including (1) the defendant’s
status as a U.S. corporation, (2) the U.S. citizenship of defendant’s
employees who allegedly committed acts of torture, (3) the U.S.
connections arising from the defendant corporation’s and its employees’
contracting with, and obtaining security clearances from, the U.S.
government,93 (4) the allegations that defendant aided and abetted torture
through conduct that took place within the United States, for example,
corporate managers located in the United States becoming aware of reports
of misconduct, seeking to “cover up” misconduct, and “implicitly, if not
expressly, encourag[ing] it,”94 and (5) “the expressed intent of Congress,
through enactment of the TVPA and 18 U.S.C. § 2340A to provide aliens
access to United States courts and to hold citizens of the United States
accountable for acts of torture committed abroad.”95
Weighing all of these factors, the Al Shimari court held that the
plaintiffs’ claims touched and concerned the territory of the United States
with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial
application of the ATS, so that the ATS conferred jurisdiction on the
district court.96

In Mujica v. AirScan Inc., plaintiffs sued AirScan Inc., a Florida-based
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90. 758 F.3d 516, 527 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. at 1669).
91. Id. at 527-28 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009)) (establishing
that a “claim” is the “aggregate of operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a
court”); see also id. at 528 (articulating that “it is not sufficient merely to say that because
the actual injuries were inflicted abroad, the claims do not touch and concern United States
territory”).
92. Id. at 527.
93. Id. at 530-31.
94. Id. at 531 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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iii. Ninth Circuit – Concrete Conduct in the U.S. Relevant
to the Wrongdoing
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771 F.3d 580, 585 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580 (9th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 592.
Id.
Id. at 591.

05/11/2017 10:58:06

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
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private security firm, and its energy-sector client Occidental Petroleum
Corp. (“Occidental”) after deaths and injuries occurred during an air
bombing in Santo Domingo, Colombia.97 Plaintiffs alleged that AirScan
provided security for Occidental against pipeline attacks by leftist
insurgents in Colombia, and that defendants had worked with the
Colombian military to provide it with financial and other assistance to
further Occidental’s commercial interests.98 Plaintiffs also alleged that
Occidental provided AirScan and the Colombian military with a room in its
Colombian offices for planning an air raid on the Santo Domingo
location.99
According to plaintiffs, AirScan and the Colombian Air Force
(“CAF”) conducted the air raid only to protect Occidental’s oil pipeline; the
raid was not conducted on behalf of the Colombian government.100 Further,
three AirScan employees and a CAF liaison piloted a plane funded by
Occidental and bearing CAF markings. AirScan used the plane to provide
CAF with aerial surveillance to identify targets and deploy troops on the
ground.101 A cluster bomb dropped by a CAF helicopter also allegedly
destroyed homes, killed seventeen civilians and wounded twenty-five
others; afterwards, CAF troops allegedly ransacked homes in Santo
Domingo.102
On these facts, the Court in Mujica observed that the “allegations that
form the basis of Plaintiffs’ claims exclusively concern conduct that
occurred in Colombia.”103 At most, the plaintiffs only “speculate[d] that
some of [the] conduct . . . could have occurred in the United States.”104
Further, the plaintiffs’ speculation about domestic conduct was found in
their reply brief, which was filed only after the Kiobel II decision was
issued.105
The lack of any concrete conduct in the U.S. caused the Ninth Circuit
to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims. The Mujica Court reasoned:
[i]n the absence of . . . allegations of conduct in the United States,
the only remaining nexus between Plaintiffs’ claims and this
country is . . . that Defendants are both U.S. corporations. That
fact . . . [wa]s not enough to establish that the ATS claims here
‘touch and concern’ the United States with sufficient force”
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under Kiobel II.106

While a “defendant’s U.S. citizenship or corporate status is one factor that,
in conjunction with other factors,” might “establish a sufficient connection
between an ATS claim and the . . . United States to satisfy Kiobel.”
However, “the Supreme Court has never suggested that a plaintiff can bring
an action based solely on extraterritorial conduct merely because the
defendant is a U.S. national.”107
Mujica indicates that mere incorporation of a defendant company in a
U.S. state, or the mere U.S. citizenship of involved individuals - without
some relevant conduct occurring within the U.S. - will not permit bringing
an ATS claim.108
iv. Eleventh Circuit – Specific, Reasonably Extensive
Allegations of Conduct Within the U.S.
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106. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
107. Id.; see also id. at n. 11 (stating that all courts to have addressed the issue, except
one, have dismissed ATS claims where the only connection to the U.S. was the defendant’s
U.S. citizenship).
108. Id. at n. 9 (stating that “[w]e do not contend that this factor is irrelevant to the
Kiobel inquiry; we merely hold that it is not dispositive of that inquiry”).
109. See Doe v. Drummond Co., 278 F.3d 576, 589-592 (11th Cir. 2015) (analyzing
Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185 (11th Cir. 2014); Baloco v.
Drummond Co. (Baloco II), 767 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2014)).
110. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592.
111. Id.
112. Id. at n. 23.
113. Id. at 592-593, n. 23.
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Reviewing both its own case law109 and other precedents in what it
called a “crowded legal landscape,”110 the Eleventh Circuit in Doe v.
Drummond Co. described its task as determining whether the ATS applies
“when aspects of the claims occur both domestically and
extraterritorially.”111
The Drummond court observed that cases usually fit into one of three
scenarios. First, if “no relevant aspects of an ATS claim occur within the
United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality prevents
jurisdiction”; second, “if some relevant aspects of the claim occur within
the United States, we must determine whether the presumption is
displaced.”112 “In a third scenario wherein all relevant aspects occur within
the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality would
obviously not apply — there would be no extraterritorial component to the
claim.”113
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the second type of scenario before it
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Id. at 592.
Drummond, 782 F.3d at 592.
Id. at 593.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 595.
Id. at 596.
Drummond, 782 F.3d at 597 (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 598.
Id.
Id.
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114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
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was a “fact-intensive inquiry.”114 Analyzing the facts before it, the court
also stated the “site of the conduct alleged is relevant and carries significant
weight.”115 Even when the claim is for secondary responsibility, the court
determined it must consider the location of underlying conduct, such as
where the actual injuries were inflicted.116 “Further, the domestic conduct
alleged must meet a ‘minimum factual predicate’ to warrant the
extraterritorial application of the ATS.”117 That is, courts must consider
whether the claims are focused within the United States and “whether the
plaintiffs have proffered allegations and evidence to the ‘degree necessary’
to warrant displacing the presumption.”118
Analyzing these factors, the Drummond court conceded that plaintiffs’
claims were brought against U.S. citizens and entities who resided in and
conducted business within the United States.119 But while the U.S.
citizenship of the defendants was relevant, that factor was “insufficient to
permit jurisdiction on its own.”120 Though defendants’ alleged support of a
“U.S.-designated terrorist organization” was also relevant, this factor
likewise “[did] not strike with ‘sufficient force’ to displace the presumption
and permit jurisdiction.”121 Rather, displacement would be warranted only
“if enough relevant conduct occurred within the United States.”122
In Drummond, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants aided, abetted
and conspired with the paramilitary group Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia (“AUC”) from within the United States, resulting in war crimes
and the extrajudicial killing of plaintiffs’ decedents in Colombia.123 The
Court noted that the “domestic or extraterritorial location of all conduct in
support of those claims is relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry.”124 Hence,
the extraterritorial deaths of plaintiffs’ family members was relevant to
plaintiffs’ claims that the AUC’s killing of their family members
constituted extrajudicial killings or war crimes violating international
law.125 However, plaintiffs also alleged relevant domestic conduct on the
part of defendants, for example, that defendants’ actions within the United
States — such as making decisions to engage with the AUC, and agreeing
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to fund the AUC — aided and abetted the AUC.126
The Drummond court ultimately concluded that plaintiffs’ claims did
not allege sufficient domestic conduct to displace the presumption against
extraterritoriality.127 Plaintiffs alleged generally that defendants made
funding and policy decisions in the United States.128 But plaintiffs also
alleged specifically that agreements between defendants and the
perpetrators of the killings, the planning and execution of the extrajudicial
killings and war crimes, the collaboration by defendants’ employees with
the AUC, and the actual funding of the AUC, all took place in Colombia.129
In light of Eleventh Circuit precedent, the domestic location of some
decision-making did not outweigh the extraterritorial location of the rest of
Plaintiffs’ claims.130
Moreover, plaintiffs’ allegations of domestic conduct and connections
were not extensive or specific.131 For example, plaintiffs generally alleged
that an employee of a defendant obtained consent within the United States
to provide substantial financial and material support to the AUC.132 These
were the same types of allegations that the Eleventh Circuit had already
rejected as insufficient.133
The Drummond court determined that the U.S. citizenship and
corporate status of defendants, the U.S. interests implicated by plaintiffs’
claims, and the U.S.-based conduct were all relevant in determining
whether plaintiffs’ claims had a U.S. focus and touched and concerned the
territory of the United States.134 But on the facts presented, those factors
were insufficient to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality.135

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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126. Id.
127. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 598.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 599.
133. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 599 (citing Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229 (11th
Cir. 2014)).
134. Id. at 600.
135. Id.
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c. Does international law recognize the asserted liability of the
defendants?
i.

State actor vs. non-state actor distinction: non-state
actors can be liable for genocide and war crimes,
but not necessarily for summary execution and
torture.

Whether an ATS action may be brought against a private person or
corporation, as contrasted to governments or governmental agents or
officials, is another question that courts continue to address with varying
results. Some jurists note that the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa
“repeatedly emphasizes the need for restraint in extending liability to a
defendant who is ‘a private actor such as a corporation or individual.’”136
And in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, the D.C. Circuit indicated that
plaintiffs’ ATS claim was barred because there was no consensus on
whether international law applied to torture committed by private, or nonstate, actors.137
In Kadic v. Karadzic, however, the Second Circuit held that
international law’s prohibition on genocide and war crimes applied
regardless of whether the defendant, arguably a private individual, acted on
behalf of a recognized state.138 While the defendant was not an official of a
recognized government, he was the self-proclaimed president of the
unrecognized Bosnian-Serb Republic in the Bosnia-Herzegovina region,
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136. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting)
(quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732, n. 20 (2004)).
137. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring) (“[I]t is worthwhile to consider . . . whether torture today is among the handful
of crimes to which the law of nations attributes individual responsibility. Definitions of
torture set out in international documents suggest it is not. . . . I decline to read section 1350
to cover torture by non-state actors, absent guidance from the Supreme Court on the
statute’s use of the term ‘law of nations.’”); see also Ali Shafi v. Palestinian Auth., 642 F.3d
1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“insufficient consensus . . . that torture by private actors
violates international law.”); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (noting
that rule of Tel-Oren and Sanchez-Espinosa v. Regan, another case holding ATS provides
no cause of action against private actors, both survive the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sosa).
138. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1996) (“Appellants’ allegations that
Karadzic personally planned and ordered a campaign of murder, rape, forced impregnation,
and other forms of torture designed to destroy . . . groups of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian
Croats clearly state a violation of the international law norm proscribing genocide,
regardless of whether Karadzic acted under color of law or as a private individual.”); id. at
243 (“all ‘parties’ to a conflict – which includes insurgent military groups – are obliged to
adhere to the most fundamental requirements of the law of war . . . . The liability of private
individuals for committing war crimes has been recognized since World War I.”).
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and had command authority over the military forces who allegedly
committed systematic rape, forced prostitution, forced impregnation and
torture.139
Kadic further indicated that—while private individuals can be liable
under the ATS for genocide140 and war crimes as defined by the Geneva
Convention141 - they may not necessarily be liable for torture or summary
execution unless committed as part of the genocide or war crimes.142
ii.

Majority view: Corporations can be liable, but as the
result of varying theories.

In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. (“Kiobel I”), the Second
Circuit clearly stated that “imposing liability on corporations,” as opposed
to natural persons,
for violations of customary international law has not attained a
discernible, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the
world . . . . [B]ecause corporate liability is not recognized as a
‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ norm . . . it is not a rule that
customary international law that we may apply under the ATS.143
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139. Id. at 237 (discussing the issue of subject matter jurisdiction).
140. See, e.g., The Geneva Convention on Genocide arts. II, IV, Dec. 9 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (indicating what constitutes genocide as well as providing associated rules);
see also Geneva Convention Implementation Act of 1987, 19 U.S.C. § 1091 (1988)
(providing a bill to implement the International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide).
141. 70 F.3d at 243.
142. Id. (“torture and summary execution – when not perpetrated in the course of
genocide or war crimes – are proscribed by international law only when committed by state
officials or under color of law.”).
143. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added), aff’d on other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1668-69 (2013).
144. Id.
145. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 57 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other
grounds, 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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The Second Circuit concluded, “[I]nsofar as plaintiffs in this action
seek to hold only corporations liable for their conduct in Nigeria . . . under
the ATS, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.”144
In a subsequent case, however, the D.C. Circuit in Doe v. Exxon Mobil
Corp. determined that corporations can be liable for torts committed by
their agents and noted it would create a “bizarre anomaly [in tort law] to
immunize corporations from liability for the conduct of their agents in
lawsuits brought for ‘shockingly egregious violations of universally
recognized principles of international law.’”145 The court later vacated Doe
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on other grounds, however.146
More recently, in In re Arab Bank PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., the
Second Circuit affirmed the Kiobel I view despite acknowledging that the
Supreme Court may have suggested otherwise, and despite also
acknowledging that the Second Circuit appears isolated in its position:
We conclude that Kiobel I is and remains the law of this Circuit,
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel II147
affirming this Court’s judgment on other grounds. . . . [O]ur view
[is] that Kiobel II suggests that the ATS may allow for corporate
liability and our observation that there is a growing consensus
among our sister circuits to that effect. Indeed, on the issue of
corporate liability under the ATS, Kiobel I now appears to swim
alone against the tide.148
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146. 527 F. App’x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
147. Kiobel II, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
148. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2015), cert. granted sub nom. Jesner
v. Arab Bank PLC, No, 16-499, 2017 WL 1199472 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2017).
149. Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1020-21 (7th Cir. 2011).
150. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2014).
151. Id. (citing Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on
other grounds, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013)).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 122.
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In contrast to Kiobel I, the Seventh Circuit has determined that
“corporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute” but also noted
that “plaintiffs concede[d] that corporate liability for . . . violations [of
customary international law] is limited to cases in which the violations are
directed, encouraged, or condoned at the corporate defendant’s decisionmaking level.”149
The Ninth Circuit has adopted what it calls a “norm-by-norm analysis
of corporate liability” under the ATS.150 Under this approach, “for each
ATS claim asserted by the plaintiffs, a court should look to international
law and determine whether corporations are subject to the norms
underlying that claim.”151 For example, the Ninth Circuit had previously
determined that the “norm against genocide and the norm against war
crimes” apply to “states, individuals and groups.”152 Further, these “norms
were ‘universal’ or applicable to ‘all actors,’ and, consequently, applicable
to corporations.”153
In Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed three
principles it had previously articulated.154 First, “the analysis proceeds
norm-by-norm; there is no categorical rule of corporate immunity or
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liability.”155 Second, “corporate liability under the ATS does not depend on
the existence of international precedent enforcing legal norms against
corporations.”156 Third, “norms that are ‘universal and absolute’ or
applicable to ‘all actors’ can provide the basis for an ATS claim against a
corporation.”157 For example, “the prohibition against slavery is universal
and may be asserted against . . . corporate defendants.”158
Like the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit – without
much elaboration – has held that corporations can be liable under the
ATS.159
d. Does international law recognize the plaintiff’s theory of
liability?
This jurisdictional prerequisite can be significant for clients or client
corporations of PSCs or PMCs. The client usually is not alleged to have
directly engaged in acts so heinous as to violate definable, universal and
obligatory norms, nor to have directly committed misconduct like torture,
piracy or slave trading. More typically, the allegations are that the client
aided or abetted the violation of international law, or conspired with others
to violate that law, giving rise to secondary or accessorial liability.
i.

Aiding and abetting liability requires a mens rea of
purpose or intent and an actus reus of knowing
practical assistance with a substantial effect.
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155. Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 747-48).
156. Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760-61).
157. Id. (citing Sarei, 671 F.3d at 760).
158. Id.
159. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); see also In re
South African Apartheid Litig., 15 F. Supp. 3d 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (noting that
Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits have held that corporations can be liable under
the ATS, describing Kiobel I opinion as a “stark outlier” and finding that corporations can
be liable under the ATS despite Kiobel I).
160. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir.
2009) (stating “[w]e agree that Sosa and our precedents send us to international law to find
the standard for accessorial liability”); see also, Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504
F.3d 254, 276 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (noting that the mens rea statute in
Rome for accomplice liability is typical of others internationally).
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For aiding and abetting claims, customary international law, as
opposed domestic law, provides the legal standard for what constitutes
aiding and abetting ATS claims.160 Under this standard, circuit courts have
generally held that the mens rea required for aiding and abetting or
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conspiracy liability is purpose or intent rather than mere knowledge.161
Specifically, the defendant must have the “purpose of facilitating the
[alleged violation]”162 or the “purpose or intent to facilitate the commission
of the specific offenses alleged.”163 This “demanding pleading standard” is
satisfied with “detailed factual allegations.”164
The actus reus required for aiding and abetting is usually phrased as
“‘knowing practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial
effect on the perpetration’” of the wrong.165 The assistance need not
constitute an “indispensable element” of the wrong; rather, a plaintiff must
show that the wrong “most probably would not have occurred in the same
way had not someone acted in the role the accused in fact assumed.”166
Merely “supplying a violator of the law of nations with funds” as part
of a commercial transaction, without more, cannot constitute aiding and
abetting a violation of international law.167 But allegations that a corporate
defendant “facilitated arms shipments” used in “carrying out attacks” and
paid the organization alleged to be carrying out the attacks “every month
for approximately seven years,” on the other hand, sufficed to allege
substantial assistance and actus reus.168
ii.

Conspiracy liability is less settled.

Conspiracy liability under the ATS is less settled.

Some courts

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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161. Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259 (“hold[ing] that the mens rea
standard for aiding and abetting liability in ATS actions is purpose rather than knowledge
alone.”); Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) (“agree[ing] with the
Second Circuit that a purpose standard alone has gained ‘the requisite acceptance among
civilized nations for application under the ATS.’”) (citation omitted); see also Doe v.
Drummond Co., No. 2:09-CV-01041, 2010 WL 9450019 at *15 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 30, 2010)
(asserting that “[a] claim of conspiracy under the ATS/TVPA requires the same proof of
mens rea as aiding and abetting claims – a showing of intent, and not merely knowledge”).
162. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 788 F.3d 946, 948 (9th Cir. 2015) (Bea, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (holding that an “aiding and abetting ATS defendant must act with the
purpose of facilitating the criminal act”) (emphasis added).
163. In re Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute Litig., 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301,
1343 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
164. Id. at 1345, 1347.
165. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 453 F. Supp. 2d 653, 666
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citations omitted), aff’d, 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Almog v.
Arab Bank PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 286-87 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Prosecutor v.
Furundzija, Case No. IT–95–17/1–T, Judgment, 235, Dec. 10, 1998 and explaining the
standards for enforcing liability on secondary parties for aiding and abetting charges).
166. Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 287; Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 453 F. Supp. 2d at
667 (citation omitted).
167. In re South African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
168. Chiquita Brands, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1350.
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continue to note that whether there is conspiracy liability under the ATS
remains an open question in their circuit.169 Other circuit courts plainly
state that conspiracy liability is “cognizable under the ATS.”170
In the district courts, pleading conspiracy entails a predictable set of
elements, for example, that (1) the corporate defendant or client and a PSC
agreed to commit a recognized international law violation, (2) the corporate
defendant or client joined the agreement with the purpose or intent to
facilitate the commission of the violation, and (3) the PSC committed the
violation.171 Litigants should be aware that at least one court has held that
conspiracy liability under the ATS “may only attach where the goal of the
conspiracy was either to commit genocide or to commit aggressive war.” 172
2. Statute of Limitations
The ATS does not specify a statute of limitations.173 In the absence of
a limitations period prescribed by the statute, federal courts borrow the
local state’s limitations period unless “a rule from elsewhere in federal law
clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes.”174
Consistent with this approach, several courts have found that the
appropriate analogy for an ATS claims’ limitations period is that found in
the TVPA, which provides a ten-year statute of limitations.175
3. Jurisprudential, or Discretionary, Exhaustion of Remedies
Generally, courts hold that the ATS imposes no express requirement
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169. See, e.g., Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 181 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing
Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 260 and discussing conspiracy liability in the
Second Circuit).
170. E.g., Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 597 (11th Cir. 2015) (finding that the
precedent in the circuit recognizes the claims under the ATS).
171. Chiquita Brands, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1351.
172. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 453 F. Supp. 2d 653, 664-65
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)
173. See, e.g., Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791, 799 (2d Cir.
2014) (explaining that no decision has been made by the Second Circuit with respect to the
statute of limitations and claims under the ATS).
174. Northstar Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 35 (1995) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
175. See, e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2009) (stating that all
courts that have made a decision regarding the statute of limitations have chosen ten years
as the limit); Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 778-79 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that the statute
of limitations is subject to the equitable tolling doctrine); Van Tu v. Koster, 364 F.3d 1196,
1199 (10th Cir. 2004) (analogizing to similar cases and determining that the ten year statute
of limitations applies); Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1012-13 (9th Cir. 2002)
(claiming that the nature of the injury requires a charitable statute of limitations period).
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that a plaintiff first exhaust his remedies in the foreign jurisdiction where
the alleged wrong occurred.176 But while the ATS contains no rigid
exhaustion requirement, U.S. courts may as a matter of comity stay or
dismiss a case without prejudice to allow the country where the alleged
wrong occurred to address it.177 Though not a prerequisite to subject-matter
jurisdiction, exhaustion of local remedies appears to have gained traction as
a factor a court may consider before exercising jurisdiction to determine the
merits.
a. A weak U.S. nexus strengthens the case for comity.

176. See, e.g., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, 484 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d in part,
dism’d in part, 402 F. App’x 834 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding that the plaintiffs need not exhaust
all remedies to state the claim), and cases cited therein.
177. Courts have stated that:
[w]hat is true is that a U.S. court might, as a matter of international comity, stay
an Alien Tort suit that had been filed in the U.S. court, in order to give the
courts of the nation in which the violation had occurred a chance to remedy it,
provided that the nation seemed willing and able to do that.
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Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1025 (7th Cir. 2011).
178. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 831 (9th Cir. 2008).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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A lack of a significant U.S. “nexus” is an important consideration in
evaluating whether plaintiffs should be required to exhaust their local
remedies in accordance with principles of international comity.178 The lack
of a significant United States nexus to the allegations militates in favor of
comity.179 Where, for example, the claims involve a foreign corporation’s
complicity in acts on foreign soil that affected only aliens, the situation
lacks the traditional bases for exercising the United States’ sovereign
jurisdiction to prescribe laws, namely nationality, territoriality, and
domestic effect within the United States.180
The Ninth Circuit in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC accordingly noted that,
while truly heinous conduct – torture, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
etc. – may implicate matters of “universal concern,” that jurisdiction may
exist does not mean that U.S. courts should necessarily exercise it.181 The
court in Sarei also noted that the basis for exercising civil jurisdiction, such
as that under the ATS, is not as well-settled as the basis for criminal
jurisdiction.182 The caution advised in Sosa counsels that in ATS cases
where the nexus to the U.S. is weak, courts should carefully consider the
question of exhaustion, particularly – though not exclusively – when the
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claims do not involve matters of “universal concern.”183
b. Burdens in the Exhaustion Inquiry
Courts considering jurisprudential exhaustion under the ATS have
determined the defendant bears the burden to plead and justify an
exhaustion requirement, including the availability of local remedies.184
Once a defendant makes a showing of remedies abroad which have not
been exhausted, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to rebut by showing that
the local remedies were “ineffective, unobtainable, unduly prolonged,
inadequate, or obviously futile.”185 To “exhaust” requires more than a
plaintiff initiating suit; the plaintiff must obtain a final decision of the
highest court in the legal system at issue, or show that the state of local law
or availability of further remedies would make further appeals futile.186
B. Torture Victims Protection Act

Id.
Sarei, 550 F.3d at 832.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id.
Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 601 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008).
28 U.S.C. § 1350, § 2(a) (2012).

05/11/2017 10:58:06

183.
184.
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187.
188.
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190.

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 59 Side B

Even when an ATS claim would be unsuccessful, plaintiffs may be
able to use the TVPA to proceed with their action.187 In contrast with the
ATS – which contains a specific jurisdictional grant but creates no causes
of action – the TVPA provides causes of action but contains no
jurisdictional grant.188 Federal courts’ jurisdiction to consider TVPA
claims, where present, is based on the general federal question
jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331.189
The TVPA provides an explicit federal law claim, stating that an:
individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of
law, of any foreign nation . . . subjects an individual to torture
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
[who] . . . subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing, shall in a
civil action, be liable for damages to the individual’s legal
representative, or to any person who may be a claimant in an
action for wrongful death.190
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1. Differences as Compared to the ATS
Certain other features further distinguish the TVPA from the ATS.
a. U.S. citizens may bring TVPA claims.
First, the TVPA empowers both United States citizens and aliens to
recover for acts of torture and extrajudicial killing.191 Causes of action do
not accrue solely in favor of aliens.
b. Express Requirement of State Action

C M
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191. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1154 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he TVPA
extended the [ATS], which had been limited to aliens, to allow citizens of the United States
to bring suits for torture and extrajudicial killings in United States courts.”).
192. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1316.
193. Id. at 1317.
194. Id. at 1316–17.
195. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1317.
196. Romero was decided before Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705
(2012).
197. Romero, 552 F.3d at 1309.
198. See Id. at 1317 (ruling that the relationship between the parties in question must
involve the subject of the complaint in order for plaintiffs to satisfy their burden).
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Second, “[t]here is an express requirement of state action in the
[TVPA].”192 This requirement entails two sub-parts.193 First, the private
actor can be held liable only when “there [exists] a symbiotic relationship
between [that] private actor and the government that involves the torture or
the killing alleged in the complaint.”194 Second, the plaintiff may prove the
relationship existed “by presenting evidence of the active participation of a
single official.”195
In Romero v. Drummond,196 for example, a labor union and relatives
of deceased union leaders sought to bring action under the TVPA against a
corporate defendant to recover based on the alleged recruitment, by the
executives of a U.S. corporation’s Colombian subsidiary, of paramilitary
forces who allegedly tortured and murdered union leaders.197
The case law in this area is developing. But in Romero, proof of only
a “general relationship” between paramilitaries who were accused of
wrongdoing and the Columbian government’s military or government
officials – without proof that this relationship involved the wrongs made
the subject of the complaint – did not show action under color of law.198
Evidence that a government official knew of the wrongs committed –
without evidence that the government was involved in those wrongs – also
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did not show action under color of law.199 Further, showing that a
corporation was aware that the foreign government sometimes supported
paramilitaries likewise was not evidence of state action or action under
color of law.200 In addition, a declaration by an individual that he became a
government official one year after a meeting with the paramilitary forces
which allegedly committed the wrongs did not show state action or action
under color of law.201
Cases like Romero suggest that a TVPA plaintiff’s showing action
under color of law involving the torture or killing alleged in the complaint
is a relatively firm requirement for bringing the TVPA cause of action.202
c. An Exhaustion Requirement with Doubts Resolved in Favor
of Plaintiff
Unlike the ATS, the TVPA contains a written exhaustion requirement
stating that a “court shall decline to hear a claim. . . if the claimant has not
exhausted adequate and available remedies in the place in which the
conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.”203 The question of exhaustion is
for the court, not the jury.204
At least one case suggests that a failure to exhaust local remedies will
result in dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.205 Other cases,
however, suggest that exhaustion of remedies is not jurisdictional.206 What
may be clear is that exhaustion of remedies is an effective affirmative
defense, but one where the defendant initially bears the burden of proof.207
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199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Cf. Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1346 (11th Cir. 2011)
(interpreting Romero to say that there is an express requirement of state action in the
TVPA).
203. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 778 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1350, § 2(b)).
204. Id.
205. See Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2003)
(interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1350, § 2(b) to say that if local remedies are not exhausted, a
district court must dismiss the TVPA claim).
206. See, e.g., Rojas Mamani v. Sanchez Berzain, 636 F.Supp.2d 1326, 1328 (S.D. Fla.
2009) (ruling that TVPA’s exhaustion requirement is “not jurisdictional in the ‘subjectmatter’ sense”); Cabello Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 291 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1365 (S.D.
Fla. 2003) (citing four cases from other districts in which courts ruled that the TVPA’s
exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional).
207. Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC, 550 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); Jean
v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 781 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp.
2d 473, 484 (D. Md. 2009), aff’d in part, dism’d in part, 402 F. App’x 834 (4th Cir. 2010)
(stating that under the TVPA, defendants bear the burden of proving that adequate local
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The same burden-shifting analysis that is used for the ATS then applies to
the TVPA’s express exhaustion requirement.
That is, the defendant bears the burden to plead and justify the
exhaustion requirement, including the availability of local remedies.208 The
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the futility of exhaustion,
but the ultimate burden remains with the defendant.209 In addition, TVPA
cases appear to suggest that any doubts as to whether plaintiff has shown
exhaustion of local remedies should be resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.210
d. No Liability for Corporations or Other Organizations
In contrast to a majority view holding that corporations can be liable
under the ATS, there exists no liability for companies or organizations
under the TVPA. In Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., the Supreme Court
examined the TVPA and held that the term “individual,” as used in the
statute, “encompasses only natural persons.”211 Thus, the TVPA “does not
impose liability against organizations.”212
Based on Mohamad, the Ninth Circuit in Mujica affirmed dismissal of
plaintiffs’ TVPA claims against defendants, both the PMC AirScan and its
client Occidental Petroleum, because defendants were “both corporations
rather than natural persons.”213
e. Definitions for Actionable Wrongs Forming the Basis of
Claims

(b) Torture. — For the purposes of this Act —
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remedies do not exist).
208. See Sarei, 550 F.3d at 832 (explaining that the burden-shifting under the ATV, that
defendants must plead and justify exhaustion of local remedies, is present under the TVPA).
209. Id.
210. See Jean, 431 F.3d at 782 (citing numerous cases from other circuits holding that
any disputes concerning the TVPA and exhaustion requirement should be resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor).
211. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1705 (2012).
212. Id.
213. Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 591 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Cardona v.
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1188-89 (11th Cir. 2014) (observing that
defendant companies were not natural persons so that the “claims under the TVPA must be
dismissed”).
214. The TVPA defines torture as:

39083 ple_19-3 Sheet No. 61 Side A

The TVPA avoids some of the murkiness encountered under the ATS
in seeking to define, for example, a tort “in violation of international law”
by providing relatively detailed definitions of the “torture” and
“extrajudicial killings” actionable under this Act.214
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f.

Extraterritorial application

Whether a TVPA claim’s being based on extra-territorial conduct may
limit a federal court’s section 1331 jurisdiction has given rise to some
judicial analysis.215 Generally, courts have determined that the language of
the TVPA and its legislative history both show it applies
extraterritorially.216

(1) the term ‘torture’ means any act, directed against an individual in the
offender’s custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suffering . . .
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on that individual for such
purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a
confession, punishing that individual for an act that individual or a third person
has committed or is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing
that individual or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or
resulting from —
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or
suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or
application, of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or

28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 3(b).
The TVPA defines “extrajudicial killing” as:
. . . a deliberate killing not authorized by a previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such term, however, does not
include any such killing that, under international law, is lawfully carried out
under the authority of a foreign nation.

C M
Y K

05/11/2017 10:58:06

28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 3(a).
The fact that the TVPA and ATS employ different definitions of “torture” and “extrajudicial
killing” may have concrete consequences. The difference means “each statute provides a
means to recover for torture [and extrajudicial killing] as [those] term[s] separately draw []
[their] meaning[s] from each statute.” Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316
(11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
215. See Doe v. Drummond Co., 782 F.3d 576, 602 (11th Cir. 2015).
216. Id.; see also, e.g., Morrison v. National Austrl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); S.
Rep. No. 102-249, at 3-5 (1991); Chowdhury v. Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Inc., 746 F.3d 42,
51 (2d Cir. 2014); H. Rep. No. 102-367 at 3 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 85
(indicating extraterritorial application).
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(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected to death,
severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personality.
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g. Knowledge and Active Assistance Required for Secondary
Liability
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217. Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1709 (2012).
218. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 604 (citing Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148,
1157-59 (11th Cir. 2005)); see id. at 1157 (“An examination of legislative history shows that
the TVPA was intended to reach beyond the person who actually committed the acts, to
those ordering, abetting or assisting in the violation.”) (citing S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 8-9
(1991)).
219. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 607 (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 9).
220. Id. at 604.
221. Id. at 608.
222. Id. at 604-05.
223. Drummond, 782 F.3d at 581, 604.
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The TVPA contemplates liability against those who did not
“personally execute the torture or extrajudicial killing.”217 Specifically, the
TVPA permits indirect liability, or aider and abettor liability, for those who
order, abet or assist a violation.218 One circuit court has interpreted the
TVPA’s legislative history to mean there is an “expansive view of liability
under the TVPA” so that “‘responsibility for torture, summary execution,
or disappearances extends beyond the person or persons who actually
committed those acts – anyone with higher authority who authorized,
tolerated or knowingly ignored those acts is liable for them.’”219
Notably, the mens rea standard for this TVPA claim is more lenient
than under the ATS. To address indirect liability, courts state that a
plaintiff must show (by a preponderance of the evidence) the individual’s
“active participation” in the wrongful act, for example, that the “defendants
gave knowing substantial assistance to the individuals committing the
wrongful act.”220 Hence, the standard for secondary liability is described as
a “knowledge” mens rea and a “substantial assistance” actus reus.221
Ultimately, in Drummond, the court concluded that summary
judgment for the two individual defendants, corporate officers James Tracy
and Augusto Jimenez, was proper.222 After adequate time for discovery,
plaintiffs uncovered no evidence that Tracy or Jimenez had any knowledge
of an alleged corporate scheme to fund or support the paramilitary group
which allegedly committed extra-judicial killings and war crimes in the
course of providing “security” for the U.S. corporation’s mining operations
in Colombia - much less evidence that they had any part in such a scheme,
or control over those who allegedly did.223 Also, the district court found
that there was no evidence that Tracy knew that noncombatants were being
murdered along the rail lines, and further noted an absence of any evidence
of Tracy’s knowledge that the paramilitary group was allegedly being paid
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by Drummond.224
Similarly, the district court found that plaintiffs had proffered no
admissible evidence with regard to Jimenez’s knowledge other than general
awareness of the presence of the paramilitary group near the mining
operations and the group’s violent methods.225 Consequently, there was no
evidence of mens rea to adequately impose secondary liability on the
corporate officers.226
At least one appeals court has acknowledged that TVPA claimants
may face significant hurdles in bringing suit against individuals employed
by or working on behalf of a company.227 The Supreme Court has also
noted obstacles which can make TVPA claims challenging for would-be
plaintiffs; for example, “[v]ictims may be unable to identify the men and
women who subjected them to [the violation], all the while knowing the
organization for whom they work.”228 Real-world plaintiffs may encounter
such challenges in pursuing their claims, and their allegations may not
yield sufficient admissible evidence after discovery to sustain their TVPA
action against the individual defendants.229 Nevertheless, this is the
legislative scheme in which TVPA plaintiffs must operate.
h. Superior or Command Liability

Id. at 604.
Id. at 605.
Id. at 604-05.
Id. at 611.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 132 S. Ct. 1702, 1710 (2012).
Drummond, 782 F.3d at 581, 611.
Id. at 609.
Id.

05/11/2017 10:58:06

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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Noting that domestic law – rather than international law – should
typically guide interpreting the TVPA, the court in Drummond also
acknowledged that legislative history makes clear that, at times, courts
should instead interpret the TVPA per international law.230 Adoption of the
superior or command responsibility doctrine, the court concluded, is one of
these instances.231
The command responsibility doctrine has three elements:
(1) the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between
the commander and the perpetrator of the crime; (2) that the
commander knew or should have known, owing to the
circumstances at the time, that his subordinates had committed,
were committing, or planned to commit acts violating of the laws
of war; and (3) that the commander failed to prevent the
commission of the crimes, or failed to punish the subordinates
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after the commission of the crimes.232
In Drummond, the Eleventh Circuit noted that a civilian superior –
including a civilian corporate officer – “could feasibly be held liable under
the doctrine, provided the plaintiffs demonstrated a superior-subordinate
relationship between the civilian and the perpetrator, averring that the
civilian was in the requisite position of authority and control.”233 The court
was also careful to note that the command responsibility doctrine is not
“broadly available to be used against all defendants under the TVPA”;
rather, it is available “if the requisite degree of responsibility, authority,
and control is present to support liability.”234
2. Who may bring a claim for the extrajudicial killing?
Courts have held that the disjunctive “or” in the TVPA’s language
should be read as creating two different alternatives treated separately.235
This means that either the “legal representative of the victim” or “a person
who has shown that he or she could be a claimant in a wrongful death
action for the victim” can recover damages under the TVPA.236
a. Legal Representatives
Courts have provided little guidance on who may qualify as the
victim’s legal representative. Victims of extrajudicial killings obviously
cannot bring their own claims. Whether a person qualifies as the “legal
representative” of such victim appears to hinge on whether the individual
bringing the claim is the executor or executrix of the decedent’s estate.237
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The legislation permits suit by the victim or the victim’s legal representative or
a beneficiary in a wrongful death action. The term “legal representative” is
used only to include situations in which the executor or executrix of the
decedent’s estate is suing or in which an individual is appearing in court as a
“friend” of the victim because of that victim’s mental or physical incapacity or
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232. Id. (citing Ford ex rel. Estate of Ford v. Garcia, 289 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir.
2002)).
233. Id. at 610.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., Baloco ex rel. Tapia v. Drummond Co., 640 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir.
2011).
236. Id.
237. The Torture Victim Protection Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. § 2(a)(2), provides that the
victim’s “legal representative” or “any person who may be a claimant in an action for
wrongful death” may recover based on an extrajudicial killing. Id. In explaining this
provision, the House of Representatives Committee Report stated that “[c]ourts may look to
state law for guidance as to which parties would be proper wrongful death claimants.” H.R.
256, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991). The Senate Committee Report elaborated:
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b. Choice of law for who is a proper claimant
At least one court, the Eleventh Circuit in Baloco, has determined that
(1) “state law should govern the determination of whether a plaintiff is a
claimant in an action for wrongful death [but (2)] where state law would
provide no remedy, a court may apply the foreign law that would recognize
the plaintiff’s claim.”238 The Baloco court noted that the TVPA’s language
does not indicate whether, in applying the relevant state’s law, a court
should apply that state’s “whole law,” including any choice-of-law
principles, or only the state’s “internal law.”239 Ultimately, the Baloco
court decided it did not need to choose between the “whole law” and the
internal law of Alabama, the forum state. Under Colombian law, the
decedents’ children would be proper wrongful death claimants.240 Thus,
the fact that Alabama choice-of-law rules would dictate that Colombian
law applied (making the children proper claimants), while Alabama
internal law would leave the children with no remedy, was ultimately of no
moment.
3. Statute of Limitations
The TVPA includes a ten-year statute of limitations.241
C. Common Law Torts
Plaintiffs bringing claims under the ATS or claims under the TVPA
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S.R 249, 102d Cong. (1st Sess. 1991) (footnote omitted).
In a footnote, the Senate Committee Report added: “[w]here application of Anglo–American
law would result in no remedy whatsoever for an extrajudicial killing, however, application
of foreign law recognizing a claim by a more distant relation in a wrongful death action is
appropriate.” Id. at n. 10 (citation omitted). As an example, the Report cited In re Air
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana in which the court allowed a nephew’s claim
even though Louisiana law provided no remedy. 789 F.2d 1092, 1097–98 (5th Cir. 1986),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 821 F.2d 1147, 1170 (5th Cir. 1987), vacated on other
grounds, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989).
238. Baloco ex rel. Tapia, 640 F.3d at 1349.
239. Id.
240. See id. at 1349-50 (noting that children are capable of bringing wrongful death
suits).
241. See Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Gandhi, 614 F. App’x 29, 31 n. 3 (2d Cir. 2015)
(discussing the ten-year statute of limitations in the TVPA and citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 n. §
27(c), which provides a ten-year statute of limitations).
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youthful age. The term “beneficiary in a wrongful death action” is generally
intended to be limited to those persons recognized as legal claimants in a
wrongful death action under Anglo–American law.
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also may allege common law tort claims arising from the same facts.
Because ATS or TVPA claims present federal question jurisdiction, state
law claims are typically filed in or removed to federal court based on
supplemental jurisdiction or pendent jurisdiction.242 These claims can
include, for example, assault and battery, wrongful death, false arrest,
wrongful imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, as well as negligent hiring, training and/or supervision.243
The advantage to a plaintiff of bringing state law tort claims based on
PSC conduct is that the categories of persons or companies who can be
sued in common law tort are generally broader than under the ATS or
TVPA.
Plaintiffs asserting common law torts encounter obstacles
nonetheless.
1. State tort laws do not apply to extraterritorial conduct.
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242. See e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 308 (4th Cir. 2000) (discussing
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367); Hassen v. Nahyan, No. CV 09-01106,
2010 WL 9538408 at *7 n. 5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2010) (stating that “[i]f the Court has
personal jurisdiction over Defendants as to Plaintiff’s TVPA cause of action, then the Court
may exercise pendent personal jurisdiction over the state tort causes of action”).
243. See HUSKEY, supra note 53, at 37 (discussing various causes of action under the
ATS and TVPA).
244. 792 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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In In re Chiquita Brands Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder
Derivative Litigation, plaintiffs asserted various common law torts under
the laws of “Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, the District of Columbia, and in
some cases the law of ‘any other applicable jurisdiction.’”244 The Chiquita
plaintiffs’ claims included assault and battery, wrongful death, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
negligence, negligent hiring, negligence per se, and loss of consortium.245
The Chiquita court noted that the plaintiffs’ state law claims were
premised on acts committed by para-militaries against Colombian civilians
which occurred in Colombia during Colombia’s civil war.246 There were
no allegations that the alleged conduct had, or intended to have, a
substantial effect within the states of Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, or within
the District of Columbia.247 Nor were the state law claims alleged, such as
ordinary tort claims for assault and battery, negligence, wrongful death,
etc., matters of universal concern recognized by the community of
nations.248 Accordingly, the court in Chiquita held that the civil tort laws of
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Florida, Ohio, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia did not apply to
the alleged torts based on extraterritorial conduct, and dismissed those
claims.249
2. No Basis for Purported Federal Common Law Claims
Some litigants have sought to bring tort claims like survival and
wrongful death claims as “federal common law” claims.250 Noting that,
with few exceptions, there is no general federal common law, courts have
dismissed these purported claims, stating that there is “no sound basis for
them.”251
3. Courts may decline supplemental jurisdiction over foreign law tort
claims.
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249. Id. at 1317.
250. See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(dismissing claims because they were based on federal common law).
251. Id. at 294.
252. Doe v. Drummond Co., 278 F.3d 576, 611 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted)
(discussing when a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction).
253. Id. at 611-12 (declining supplemental jurisdiction due to the complexity of the
Colombian laws at issue).
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Given that state and purported federal common law tort claims can
meet these ends, it is no surprise that other plaintiffs have alleged tort
claims under the law of the jurisdiction where the alleged wrongdoing
occurred. These foreign-law tort claims may also be dismissed when a
district court refuses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over them.
Claims under ATS and TVPA are based on federal statutes, giving rise
to jurisdiction in federal courts. In exercising jurisdiction over these
federal claims, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over nonfederal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. But a district court may also
“decline supplemental jurisdiction when ‘the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of state law.’”252 In at least one case, the court declined to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a plaintiff’s wrongful death claims,
finding that the claims presented sufficiently complex issues under foreign
(i.e. Colombian) law that it would have been difficult for the court to
correctly apply that law.253
Circuit courts have also affirmed a district court’s discretionary
decision to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreign state
law tort claims due to the difficulty inherent in reconciling conflicting
translations of foreign legal precedents, navigating the complexity of the
parties’ submissions, and discerning foreign law requisites for wrongful
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death claims.254
Given the difficulty of showing that a district court abused its
discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over foreignstate tort law claims,255 litigants should anticipate that a court may decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such claims.
4. Dismissal Based on International Comity
Federal courts also may dismiss state law tort claims based upon
doctrine of international comity.256 This doctrine is described as the
“golden rule among nations”257 and as “the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who
are under the protection of its laws.”258
In particular, the second strain of this doctrine, “comity among courts”
or “adjudicatory comity,” is “viewed as a discretionary act of deference by
a national court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in a case properly
adjudicated in a foreign state.”259
Increasingly, courts may be of the view that a “true conflict” between
the domestic law and foreign law is not a predicate or requirement for
international comity.260 Courts have not required proof of a true conflict
when considering application of adjudicatory comity.261 Instead, courts
look to a list of factors bearing on their discretion to invoke comity. A
frequently cited list is taken from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
Ungaro-Benages v. Dredsner Bank Ag; it includes “[1] the strength of the

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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254. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008) (discussing and
affirming the district court’s decision to decline to consider the plaintiff’s wrongful death
claim under Colombian law).
255. See e.g., Drummond, 278 F.3d at 612 (finding that the district court did not abuse
its discretion).
256. See e.g., Mujica v. AirScan Inc., 771 F.3d 580, 596-97 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing
a state law tort claim based on the doctrine of international comity).
257. Id. at 608 (describing international comity).
258. Id. at 597 (citations omitted) (discussing international comity); see also Societie
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522, 543 n. 27 (1987) (stating that “[c]omity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a
domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other
sovereign states”).
259. Mujica, 771 F.3d at 599 (discussing a part of the international comity doctrine).
260. Id. (refining the “true conflict” analysis to require proof of such a conflict “only in
cases where prescriptive comity is at issue – that is, where a party claims that it is subject to
conflicting regulatory schemes, such as antitrust laws or bankruptcy rules that apply
extraterritorially”).
261. Id. at 601 (discussing international comity).
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United States’ interests in using a foreign forum, [2] the strength of the
foreign government’s interests, and [3] the adequacy of the alternative
forum.”262 The Ninth Circuit has sub-divided the first factor, U.S.
interests,263 and the third factor, adequacy of the forum,264 into additional
lists of non-exclusive factors.
These factors obviously can be case-specific and country-specific.
However, they appear to offer courts which are disinclined to hear foreign
tort law claims another basis for dismissal.
III.

THOUGHTS FOR A DISCUSSION OF POLICY AND
COMPREHENSIVE LEGISLATION

In a democracy, the state should have a monopoly on the legitimate
use of violence in the interest of public order.265 In practice however,
PMCs act as an extension of the state. Though governments may outsource
some of their use-of-force function to PMCs, backlash against using PMCs
can result - and the legitimacy of democracies can be questioned and
eroded - if the public disapproves of a PMCs conduct. Negative
perceptions and consequences can result from incidents involving the
perceived disproportionate use of force.266
Perhaps because the public perceives that the United States’ regulation
and control of PMCs, and the government’s oversight process for
contracting with PMCs,267 are well thought-out and sound, there is little
reason to predict that the U.S.’s trend toward contracting with PMCs will
decrease. PMCs serving in Iraq alone, for example, have benefitted from
annual contracts with the U.S. at an amount estimated to be more than $1

05/11/2017 10:58:06
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262. Ungaro-Benages v. Dresdner Bank Ag, 379 F.3d 1227, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004).
263. Non-exclusive factors to assess U.S. interests include: (1) the location of the
conduct in question, (2) the nationality of the parties, (2) the character of the conduct in
question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy
interests. Mujica, 771 F.3d at 604; see id. at 607 (analyzing how foreign interests mirror
that of U.S. interests).
264. When evaluating the adequacy of the of the foreign forum, courts consider
decisions rendered by that alternative forum and ask “(1) whether the judgment was
rendered via fraud; (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing
proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3) whether the foreign judgment is
prejudicial [and] . . . repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just.” Id. at
608 (citations omitted).
265. See generally MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION
154 (Oxford Univ. Press 1964) (discussing the state’s use of violence).
266. See O’Brien, supra note 6, at 5 (discussing PMCs in combat zones and their
potential problems).
267. See, e.g., id. at 27-28, 53-55 (noting the “FY2007 and FY2008 Defense
Authorization Acts seek to reign in all PMCs and make them more accountable for
actions”).
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268. Id. at 1 (discussing U.S. contracts with PMCs during the military operations in
Iraq). See, e.g., Junio Valerio Palomba, Private Military Companies and the Pursuit of
Legitimacy, E-INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Oct. 2, 2009), available at http://www.eir.info/2009/10/02/private-military-security-companies-and-the-pursuit-of-legitimacy/
[https://perma.cc/9R3M-79JJ] (citing Rita Abrahamsen, Michael C. Williams, The
Globalization of Private Security, ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/02) (Chatham House, London
Oct. 2005) (stating that “[t]he current estimated value of the global private security sector is
in fact close to $100 billion and it represents one of the fastest growing sectors of the
economy worldwide”).
269. See, O’Brien, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing a recent situation where the U.S.
employed PMCs).
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billion.268 And the role of PMCs in that region has only appeared to grow
with the myriad tasks that PMCs currently perform for the U.S. military.269
As noted, coincident with democracies outsourcing more of their
military functions to PMCs, private corporations - rather than appealing to
governments for protection in, for example, the Middle East, or in shipping
lanes off the east African coast – are increasingly contracting directly with
PSCs to provide security in or near unstable regions outside the U.S.
Instead of appealing to the U.S. government to use taxpayer funds to
protect them or their personnel overseas, private companies increasingly
short-circuit that process by paying for the security function themselves
and hiring private companies to perform what, in some circumstances,
would have in the past been a governmental function. As one can see from,
for example, the Citizen Services section of the website for the U.S.
Embassy in Iraq, the United States is aware of this trend.
Given that corporations chartered by states in the U.S. are contracting
with private companies to provide services which the U.S. government (or
governments aligned with it) have historically provided for U.S. interests
overseas, it seems clear that the federal government has a legitimate
interest in regulating that process.
All the above observations are easy. As usual, the devil is in the
details for any proposal to address them.
Most would agree that the ATS is, by American standards, an ancient
statute. This Act and more recent case law interpreting it form much of the
legal authority in this area, as supplemented by the TVPA and by gardenvariety tort, choice-of-law, and comity principles. Given the growth in
private corporations’ use of PSCs, some would argue that a better approach
would be for Congress to preempt the current patchwork of laws from
various areas with a modernized statute addressed specifically to private
corporations’ contracting with PSCs to provide services outside the U.S.
Advantages for the public, the U.S. government, the PSC industry, and its
clients from a new statute could include:
Greater predictability in the law. There are currently conflicts in the
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case law which mean that clients of PSCs encounter different results
depending on where in the U.S. they are sued. Legislation can eliminate
those conflicts. And clearly drafted legislation would likely allow the PSC
industry to plan and to conduct itself with greater legal precision than a
body of law made up largely of court cases which can evolve sporadically
and without public comment being received.
Greater comfort on the part of the public with the PSC industry.
Many of the concerns about PSC activities could be addressed with better
transparency. Legislation could enable a certification body, and provide
for the promulgation of standards to be met before PSCs could enter
contracts with private corporations.
If the public perceives that a capable body has promulgated sensible
standards for PSCs, and that PSCs are required to meet those standards
before being permitted to contract with private corporations, some concerns
around the PSC industry might be significantly reduced.
Business and efficiency concerns. Similar to, but distinct from,
issues of clarity in the law for those who bring or defend actions against
PSC clients, are issues of business efficiency. Litigation to the side, putting
all the rules in one place in a preemptive, well thought-out piece of
legislation would better allow PSCs and their clients to execute business
plans in a way that plans to obey the law and avoid litigation in the first
instance. This is a legitimate business concern. From a purely business
perspective, avoiding litigation is its own reward.
On the flip side, both claimants’ firms and claimants themselves have
financial (as opposed to legal) concerns about the costs vs. benefits of
embarking down a litigation path. Again, a single, preemptive body of
clear law would better allow claimants and their lawyers to weigh the
business pros and cons in determining whether and how to initiate and
execute litigation.
International confidence in the United States’ policy. PSCs are
often populated by alumni of western militaries. PSCs are also often
headquartered in western democracies, including the U.S. In addition, the
corporate clients of PSCs are very often U.S. or western companies (whose
appetites for PSC services show little sign of abating).
In these circumstances, the U.S. Government’s having a modern,
clear, and sensible plan for oversight of a growing private industry which
has the capability to apply deadly force is appropriate. Being aware of the
industry’s growth, recognizing the need for the industry in the private
sector, and responding with a modern legal scheme would indicate that the
United States’ government is aware and responsible.
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CONCLUSION
Corporations employing personnel or maintaining facilities in or near
unstable regions of the world, or near areas where terrorist acts can occur,
are increasingly likely to retain PSCs. To perform the functions for which
they are engaged, PSC personnel are at times armed. Given the functions
for which PSCs are retained and the environments where they work, client
corporations should not be surprised if incidents involving the use of force
sometimes occur.
When these incidents occur, affected members of the local population
sometimes seek to bring legal action against the client corporations in the
U.S. As shown above, client corporations have a number of relatively
well-established defenses and defensive theories to assert in response.
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